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An essential step in quantum key distribution is the estimation of parameters related to the leaked amount
of information, which is usually done by sampling of the communication data. When the data size is finite,
the final key rate depends on how the estimation process handles statistical fluctuations. Many of the present
security analyses are based on the method with simple random sampling, where hypergeometric distribution or
its known bounds are used for the estimation. Here we propose a concise method based on Bernoulli sampling,
which is related to binomial distribution. Our method is suitable for the BB84 protocol with weak coherent
pulses, reducing the number of estimated parameters to achieve a higher key generation rate compared to the
method with simple random sampling. We also applied the method to prove the security of the differential-
quadrature-phase-shift (DQPS) protocol in the finite-key regime. The result indicates that, the advantage of the
DQPS protocol over the phase-encoding BB84 protocol in terms of the key rate, which was previously confirmed
in the asymptotic regime, persists in the finite-key regime.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant par-
ties to share a secret key and realizes a communication with
information-theoretic security by combining it with one-time-
pad encryption. Since the BB84 protocol was proposed by
Bennett and Brassard [1], a large number of researches on
QKD have been conducted from both aspects of theory and
implementations. The security of QKD is based only on prin-
ciples of quantum physics where eavesdropped information
is bounded from the observed parameters in a protocol. In
practice, the estimation of this bound should take into account
statistical fluctuations due to the finite size of communication
data, which requires so-called finite-key analysis. Following
the security definition with composability [2, 3], the finite-
key analyses for various QKD protocols including the BB84
protocol were conducted assuming the adversary’s general at-
tacks [4–10].
For a finite-key analysis, a simple method with a smaller
number of estimation processes is preferred because it leads
not only to a more concise security proof but also to a higher
key-generation rate especially when the number of communi-
cation rounds is limited and statistical fluctuations are large. A
number of recent finite-key analyses are based on the method
with simple random sampling, which is used to model n1
draws, without replacement, from a finite population of size
n2 that contains k2 errors. The probability that the number of
errors in the sample is k1 obeys hypergeometric distribution
HG(k1; n1, k2, n2) :=
(
k2
k1
)(
n2−k2
n1−k1
)(
n2
n1
) . (1)
In several finite-key analyses [8, 9] based on simple random
sampling, efforts were made to find bounds on hypergeometric
distribution which are related to binomial distribution in order
to simplify numerical calculation.
In order to mitigate the inefficiency arising from basis mis-
match between the sender and the receiver, the BB84 protocol
is often implemented with biased basis choice [11], in which
the minor basis is used solely for monitoring leaked informa-
tion in the major basis. In this case, the whole data from the
rounds in the monitoring basis is regarded as a sample, with
each round selected with a constant probability dictated in the
protocol as that of the basis choice. This suggests that the data
from the monitoring basis is related to Bernoulli sampling, in
which each element of the population of size n2 is sampled
with fixed probability p1. The number of samples n1 obeys
binomial distribution
BI(n1; n2, p1) :=
(
n2
n1
)
pn11 (1 − p1)n2−n1 . (2)
If the BB84 protocol with biased basis choice essentially
includes the property of the binomial distribution, analysis
based on the conventional simple random sampling may in-
troduce unnecessary complexity and possibly leads to a lower
key rate.
In this paper, we work on the finite-key analysis by focusing
on the Bernoulli sampling instead of simple random sampling.
We propose the method based on binomial distribution which
is parametrized by the basis choice probabilities in the pro-
tocol. Differently from the previous works which deal with
binomial distribution to derive bounds on hypergeometric dis-
tribution, our work is based on binomial distributions inherent
in the protocol. Our method is especially suited for the BB84
protocol with weak coherent pulses (WCP), providing a sim-
pler analysis with less estimation processes as well as achiev-
ing a higher key rate compared to the analysis with simple
random sampling. We further apply this method to the dif-
ferential quadrature phase shift (DQPS) protocol [12], whose
security was proved recently in the asymptotic regime [13].
As a result, we show that the advantage of the DQPS pro-
tocol over the phase-encoded BB84 protocol with WCP still
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2remains in the finite key regime.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we describe
details of the BB84 protocol which is considered in this work,
along with a summary of notations used in this paper. In
Sec. III, we propose a method of finite-key analysis based on
Bernoulli sampling, and applies it to the ideal BB84 protocol
where Alice and Bob can manipulate perfect single photon
states. The proposed method is then applied to the BB84 pro-
tocol with WCP as well as the DQPS protocol in Sec. IV A.
Finally, we give discussion and conclusion in Sec. V.
II. BB84 PROTOCOL
In most part of this paper, we discuss the finite key analysis
of the BB84 protocol [14], which is given in the following.
The sender Alice and the receiver Bob independently chooses
two bases (Z basis and X basis) with a biased probability. The
final key is generated only from Z-basis data, while X-basis
data is used for leak monitoring to determine the amount for
privacy amplification. The number of total rounds nrep are pre-
determined and there is no threshold for data size after sifting
process, which means that the size of sifted key nZ and that of
monitoring bits nX are not determined until quantum commu-
nication is over.
The protocol proceeds as follows with predetermined
parameters p˜Z , p˜X = 1 − p˜Z and nrep. In its description, |κ|
represents the length of a bit sequence κ.
(1) Alice chooses Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z
and p˜X , respectively. She chooses a uniformly random bit
{0, 1}.
(2) Alice prepares one of states {ρˆZ,0, ρˆZ,1, ρˆX,0, ρˆX,1} based on
the selected basis and bit. She sends the prepared state to Bob
over the quantum channel.
(3) Bob chooses Z basis or X basis with probability p˜Z and
p˜X , respectively. He measures a received state in chosen basis
and obtains the outcome {0, 1, no-detection}.
(4) They repeat the sequence (1) to (3), which we call a
round, by nrep times.
(5) Bob publicly announces whether each round has resulted
in a detection or not. Let ndet be the number of rounds with
detection.
(6) Alice and Bob disclose all of their basis choices. Among
the ndet detected rounds, the rounds where both Alice and
Bob chose the Z basis are called “Z-labeled” rounds, and the
rounds where they chose the X basis are called “X-labeled”
rounds. They define sifted keys κA,Z and κB,Z by concate-
nating the bits for the Z-labeled rounds, and similarly define
κA,X and κB,X for the X-labeled rounds. Let their sizes be
nZ := |κA,Z | = |κB,Z | and nX := |κA,X | = |κB,X |.
(7) They disclose and compare κA,X and κB,X to determine the
number of bit errors kX included in them.
(8) Through public discussion, Bob corrects his keys κB,Z
to make it coincide with Alice’s key κA,Z and obtains κcorB,Z
(|κcorB,Z | = nZ).
(9) Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by shorten-
ing κA,Z and κcorB,Z to obtain final keys κ
fin
A,Z and κ
fin
B,Z of size nfin.
In the subsequent sections, we discuss how we can deter-
mine the final key length nfin as a function of the random vari-
ables nZ , nX , and kX obtained in the protocol to satisfy a given
security criteria. For convenience, we define several variables
and parameters as ntot := nX + nZ and
pZ :=p˜2Z/(p˜
2
Z + p˜
2
X),
pX :=p˜2X/(p˜
2
Z + p˜
2
X). (3)
Throughout this paper, we adopt an abuse of notation to use
the same symbol for a random variable n˜ and its value n,
whenever the distinction is obvious. For example, we de-
note Pr(n > 3) instead of Pr(n˜ > 3). We denote by Pr(n)
the probability mass function Pr(n˜ = n). Similarly, we use
Pr(n | m) instead of Pr(n˜ = n | m˜ = m). We define |0Z〉
and |1Z〉 as basis vectors of Z basis on a qubit system, and
|0X〉 := (|0Z〉+ |1Z〉)/
√
2 and |1X〉 := (|0Z〉 − |1Z〉)/
√
2 as those
of X basis. When the same notations are used for an optical
signal, it should be understood that they refer to the states in
the subspace of a single photon contained in two modes, such
as polarizations. The four Bell sates are represented as |Φ±〉
and |Ψ±〉 where
|Φ±〉 := 1√
2
(|00Z〉 ± |11Z〉), (4)
|Ψ±〉 := 1√
2
(|01Z〉 ± |10Z〉). (5)
We define a function h(x) for x ≥ 0 as
h(x) =
{−xlog2x − (1 − x)log2(1 − x) (0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2)
1 (x > 1/2). (6)
III. ANALYSIS FOR THE IDEAL BB84 PROTOCOL
Here we consider finite-key analysis for the ideal qubit-
based BB84 protocol, in which Alice sends a single photon
in the states {ρˆW,a = |aW〉 〈aW |S } (W ∈ {Z, X}, a ∈ {0, 1}) in
Step (2) and Bob conducts ideal measurement with unit ef-
ficiency described by POVM (positive operator-valued mea-
sure) {|0W〉 〈0W |S , |1W〉 〈1W |S , 1ˆS − |0W〉 〈0W |S − |1W〉 〈1W |S }
corresponding to the outcome {0,1,no-detection}.
A. Security criteria and formalism for key length
In this work, we follow the security definition based on uni-
versally composable security [2, 3]. The protocol is called sec
secure if it is both c-correct and s-secret where sec = c + s.
We call the protocol is c-correct if Pr(κfinA,Z , κ
fin
B,Z) ≤ c holds.
We call the protocol is s-secret if
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ρˆfinAE − ρˆidealAE ∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ s (7)
where ρˆfinAE :=
∑
κfinA,Z
p(κfinA,Z) |κfinA,Z〉 〈κfinA,Z |⊗ρˆE(κfinA,Z) is a classical-
quantum state between Alice’s key and Eve’s system after
3finishing the protocol and ρˆidealAE is an ideal separable state in
which Alice’s key is uniformly distributed over 2|κ
fin
A,Z | values
and decoupled from Eve’s system.
In the ideal BB84 protocol, Alice’s procedure of selecting a
random bit and a basis, and preparing the corresponding sig-
nal can be replaced [15] by preparation of |Φ+〉AS followed by
the measurement on the system A on {|0Z〉A , |1Z〉A} (Z-basis)
or on {|0X〉A , |1X〉A} (X-basis). Bob’s measurement is also re-
placed by a filtering operation to make sure a single photon is
received and transfer its state to a qubit B, followed by the or-
thogonal measurement of B on the chosen basis to determine
the outcome 0 or 1. When the filtering fails, the outcome is
“no-detection”. According to Ref. [16, 17], a phase error oc-
curs when Alice and Bob conduct virtual Bell-basis measure-
ment on a Z-labeled round after Eve’s intervention to obtain
the outcome for |Φ−〉 〈Φ−|AB or |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|AB. Since we have
the relation
|Φ−〉 〈Φ−|AB + |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−|AB = |01X〉 〈01X |AB + |10X〉 〈10X |AB ,
(8)
phase error is equivalently defined as a bit error which occurs
when Alice and Bob conduct virtual X-basis measurement af-
ter Eve’s intervention on a Z-labeled round. An important
property which will be used in the next subsection is that the
measurement for a phase error on a Z-labeled round and the
measurement for a bit error on an X-labeled round are identi-
cal, and hence they only differs in the labeling.
Let kph be a random variable which represents the number
of phase errors on nZ Z-labeled rounds. Once we have a good
upper bound on kph, a secure key length can be calculated as
follows. Suppose that we have a function f (kX , nX , ntot) which
satisfies
Pr(kph > f (kX , nX , ntot)) ≤ PE (9)
regardless of Eve’s attack strategy. By setting [8]
s =
√
2
√
PE + PA, (10)
the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if the final key length
nfin satisfies
nfin ≤ nZ −
⌈
nZh
(
f (kX , nX , ntot)
nZ
)
+ log2
1
PA
⌉
− λEC(c). (11)
where d e represents the ceiling function and λEC(c) is the cost
of error correction to achieve c-correctness. For simplicity,
we will replace the right-hand side by a slightly pessimistic
bound as
nfin ≤ nZ(1 − h
(
f (kX , nX , ntot)
nZ
)
) − log2 2
PA
− λEC(c). (12)
B. Bounds on phase errors
In this subsection, we discuss the specific methods to ob-
tain f (kX , nX , ntot) in Eq. (9) including a method based on the
Bernoulli sampling, and a more conventional method based on
the simple random sampling. We also introduce a third, rather
convoluted method, which will help to elucidate the difference
between the former two methods.
Before discussing each of the methods, we first derive gen-
eral statistical properties. Since the Z-labeled phase error
and the X-labeled bit error are obtained by identical measure-
ments, the procedure to obtain those errors is equivalent to the
following steps after discarding the rounds with no-detection
(i.e., with Bob failing to receive a qubit): (a) Alice and Bob
further discard each of the remaining rounds with probability
1 − p˜2Z − p˜2X . (b) They make X-basis measurements on the
remaining ntot rounds and obtain ktot errors. (c) Finally, they
label each of the ntot rounds as Z or X with probability pZ and
pX (see Eq. (3)), respectively, and obtain kph phase errors in
Z-labeled rounds and kX = ktot − kph bit errors in X-labeled
rounds. In this procedure, since kX errors are sampled from
ktot errors with a fixed probability pX , it follows a binomial
distribution if ktot and ntot are fixed:
Pr(kX | ktot, ntot) = BI(kX; ktot, pX). (13)
On the other hand, the step (c) of the above procedure is equiv-
alently denoted as follows: Alice and Bob draw a number nX
based on the binomial distribution BI(nX; ntot, pX), and then
select nX random rounds among the ntot rounds to label as
X, thereby determining kX . This implies that the number kX
obeys hypergeometric distribution if nX , ktot and ntot are fixed:
Pr(kX | nX , ktot, ntot) = HG(kX; nX , ktot, ntot). (14)
In order to use the properties derived above, it is convenient
to reformulate Eq. (9) as follows. From Eq. (9), we have∑
ktot,ntot
Pr(kph > f (kX , nX , ntot) | ktot, ntot)Pr(ktot, ntot) ≤ PE.
(15)
Since Pr(ktot, ntot) can be under control of Eve, we seek for
f (kX , nX , ntot) satisfying
Pr(kph > f (kX , nX , ntot) | ktot, ntot) ≤ PE (16)
for any ktot and ntot, which is a sufficient condition for Eq. (9).
For later convenience, we equivalently describe Eq. (16) as∑
kX ,nX ;kX<ktot− f (kX ,nX ,ntot)
Pr(kX , nX | ktot, ntot) ≤ PE. (17)
The first method to determine f (kX , nX , ntot), whose util-
ity we will emphasize throughout this paper, is based on
Bernoulli sampling using the property of binomial distribu-
tion Eq. (13). This method adopts f (kX , nX , ntot) = fBI(kX)
where
fBI(kX) := min
{
ktot
∣∣∣∣CBI(kX; ktot, pX) ≤ PE} − kX − 1 (18)
CBI(kX; ktot, pX) :=
∑
k′X≤kX
BI(k′X; ktot, pX). (19)
The proof that fBI(kX) satisfies Eq. (16) is as follows. Let
kX(ktot) := max{kX | ktot > fBI(kX) + kX}. Then we have∑
kX ; ktot> fBI(kX )+kX
BI(kX; ktot, pX) ≤ CBI(kX(ktot); ktot, pX). (20)
4Since CBI(kX; ktot, pX) is a decreasing function of ktot, from
Eq. (18) we have CBI(kX; ktot, pX) ≤ PE for any pair
(kX , ktot) satisfying ktot ≥ fBI(kX) + kX + 1. Since ktot ≥
fBI(kX(ktot)) + kX(ktot) + 1 holds by definition of kX(ktot),
we have CBI(kX(ktot); ktot, pX) ≤ PE. By connecting this to
Eq. (20), we have ∑
kX ; kX<ktot− fBI(kX )
BI(kX; ktot, pX) ≤ PE, (21)
for any ktot. From Eqs. (13) and (21), we have∑
kX ,nX ; kX<ktot− fBI(kX )
Pr(kX , nX | ktot, ntot)
=
∑
kX ; kX<ktot− fBI(kX )
Pr(kX | ktot, ntot)
≤ PE, (22)
which is identical to Eq. (17) with f (kX , nX , ntot) = fBI(kX).
Therefore, we have
Pr(kph > fBI(kX) | ktot, ntot) ≤ PE. (23)
As a result of the Bernoulli-sampling method, the protocol is
c-correct and s-secret if the final key length nfin satisfies
nfin ≤ l(BI) := nZ(1 − h
(
fBI(kX)
nZ
)
) − log2 2
PA
− λEC(c). (24)
where s is given by Eq. (10).
The second method is based on simple random sam-
pling, applying the property of the hypergeometric distribu-
tion Eq. (14), which is already seen in Ref. [4, 6–8], for ex-
ample. This method adopts f (kX , nX , ntot) = fHG(kX , nX , ntot)
where
fHG(kX , nX , ntot) := min
{
ktot
∣∣∣∣CHG(kX; nX , ktot, ntot) ≤ PE}
− kX − 1
CHG(kX; nX , ktot, ntot) :=
∑
k′X≤kX
HG(k′X; nX , ktot, ntot). (25)
The proof that fHG(kX , nX , ntot) satisfies Eq. (16) is similar to
the proof for fBI(kX). Recall that the proof for fBI(kX) did
not use the explicit form of BI(k′X , ktot, pX) but only used the
decreasing property of CBI(kX; ktot, pX) as a function of ktot.
SinceCHG(kX; nX , ktot, ntot) is also a decreasing function of ktot,
we have ∑
kX ; kX<ktot− fHG(kX ,nX ,ntot)
HG(kX; nX , ktot, ntot) ≤ PE (26)
for any nX , ktot and ntot, which is analogous to Eq. (21). From
Eqs. (14) and (26), we have∑
kX ,nX ; kX<ktot− fHG(kX ,nX ,ntot)
Pr(kX , nX | ktot, ntot)
=
∑
kX ,nX ; kX<ktot− fHG(kX ,nX ,ntot)
Pr(kX | nX , ktot, ntot)Pr(nX | ktot, ntot)
≤ PE, (27)
which is identical to Eq. (17) with f (kX , nX , ntot) =
fHG(kX , nX , ntot). Therefore, we have
Pr(kph > fHG(kX , nX , ntot) | ktot, ntot) ≤ PE. (28)
As a result of the method with simple random sampling, the
protocol is c-correct and s-secret if the secret key length nfin
satisfies
nfin ≤ l(HG) := nZ(1−h
(
fHG(kX , nX , ntot)
nZ
)
)− log2 2
PA
−λEC(c)
(29)
where s is given by Eq. (10).
To understand the relation between the two methods with
Bernoulli sampling and simple random sampling, we intro-
duce another method which uses full knowledge of the dis-
tribution Pr(kX , nX | ktot, ntot) appearing in Eq. (17). The ar-
gument before Eq. (13) also implies that the number mX :=
nX − kX of X-labeled rounds without bit error obeys binomial
distribution BI(mX; ntot − ktot, pX), and that mX and kX are in-
dependent conditioned on ktot and ntot. We thus obtain
Pr(kX , nX | ktot, ntot) = BI(kX; ktot, pX)BI(nX − kX; ntot − ktot, pX).
(30)
The argument leading to Eq. (14) gives another expression for
the distribution as
Pr(kX , nX | ktot, ntot) = HG(kX; nX , ktot, ntot)BI(nX; ntot, pX).
(31)
As a result, Eq. (17) is expressed in the following two equiva-
lent ways: ∑
kX ,mX ;kX<ktot− f (kX ,kX+mX ,ntot)
BI(kX; ktot, pX)BI(mX; ntot − ktot, pX)
≤ PE.
(32)
or ∑
kX ,nX ;kX<ktot− f (kX ,nX ,ntot)
HG(kX; nX , ktot, ntot)BI(nX; ntot, pX) ≤ PE.
(33)
Since fBI(kX) satisfies Eq. (21), Eq. (32) holds if f (kX , kX +
mX , ntot) = fBI(kX). Similarly, since fHG(kX , nX , ntot) satisfies
Eq. (26), Eq. (33) holds if f (kX , nX , ntot) = fHG(kX , nX , ntot).
On the other hand, the condition of Eqs. (32) and (33) do not
imply Eq. (21) or Eq. (26). Therefore, there could be a bet-
ter bound compared to fBI(kX) and fHG(kX , nX , ntot) based on
Eq. (32) or Eq. (33). In general, it is very complicated to de-
termine the optimal function f (kX , nX , ntot) for the final key
length nfin, since it will depend on the explicit functional de-
pendence of nfin on f (kX , nX , ntot).
The difference between the two equivalent conditions
Eqs. (32) and (33) is the choice of two variables from three
no-independent random variables kX , nX and mX . When
(kX , nX) are chosen in Eq. (33), the distribution of kX ,
HG(kX; nX , ktot, ntot) is dependent on the value of nX . On the
5other hand, Eq. (32) implies that two variables (kX ,mX) are
independent of each other. This suggests that the underlying
statistics in the BB84 protocol with biased basis choice are
understood in terms of independent binomial distributions.
Let us mention the difference from the other works [8, 9]
which deal with relations between bounds on binomial dis-
tribution and ones on hypergeometric distribution since the
former are easily treated with existing mathematical pack-
ages. Ref. [8] uses the property, which dates back to Ho-
effding [18], that expectation of a convex function over hy-
pergeometric dirstribution is no larger than that over binomial
distribution. In [9], Ahrens map [19] was used to show that
hypergeometric dirstribution is bounded by a permutated bi-
nomial distribution within a factor of
√
2. In contrast to these
works, in our case the probability distribution Eq. (13) reflects
the binomial distribution inherent in the BB84 protocol with
biased basis choice.
C. Numerical examples
Here we numerically compare the final key lengths derived
from the three methods in the last subsection in the simplest
cases. We calculate the key lengths for the case where no error
is observed (kX = 0) and every signal is detected (ntot = nrep).
The cost of error correction is set to λEC(c) = log2(1/c). We
also assume nZ = nrep p˜2Z and nX = nrep p˜
2
X .
If we do not care about the key length for kX > 0, the op-
timal choice of f (kX , nX , ntot) satisfying Eq. (33) (or Eq. (32))
is given by f (kX , nX , ntot) = ntot − nX for kX ≥ 1 and
f (0, nX , ntot) = f
(kX=0)
opt (nX , ntot) with
f (kX=0)opt (nX , ntot) := min
{
ktot
∣∣∣∣G(nX; ktot, ntot) ≤ PE} − 1
G(nX; ktot, ntot)
:=
∑
nX≤n′X≤ntot−ktot
HG(0; n′X , ktot, ntot)BI(n
′
X; ntot, pX). (34)
The proof is analogous to the one for fBI(kX) or
fHG(kX , nX , ntot). Since G(nX; ktot, ntot) is a decreasing func-
tion of ktot, by using an argument similar to the one leading to
Eq. (21), we have∑
nX ; ktot> f
(kX=0)
opt (nX ,ntot)
HG(0; nX , ktot, ntot)BI(nX; ntot, pX) ≤ PE.
(35)
This is identical to Eq. (33) since kX < ktot − f (kX , nX , ntot) is
never satisfied for kX ≥ 1. The key length when kX = 0 was
observed is then given by
l(opt) := nZ(1−h
 f (kX=0)opt (nX , ntot)nZ
)− log2 2PA −λEC(c). (36)
In Fig. 1, we show the secure key ratios to the asymptotic
case l(BI)/nrep, l(HG)/nrep and l(opt)/nrep as functions of total
rounds of the protocol nrep. For each nrep, the value of p˜X
was optimized to maximize the key length. In the limit of
FIG. 1. Secure key ratio of the qubit-based BB84 protocol to the
asymptotic limit as a function of total rounds of the protocol nrep. We
assume no errors (kX = 0) and no loss (ntot = nrep). The security
parameters are set to c = 10−15 and s = 10−10. The top, middle and
bottom curves represent the ratios l(opt)/nrep, l(HG)/nrep (method with
simple random sampling) and l(BI)/nrep (Bernoulli-sampling method),
respectively. In the limit of nrep → ∞, each curve converges to
l/nrep = 1.
nrep → ∞, each curve converges to l/nrep = 1. The security pa-
rameters are set to c = 10−15 and s = 10−10, PE = 1/4×10−20
and PA = 1/4 × 10−20. We see that although the key rate l(opt)
is the best, the three methods achieve almost the same key
length.
IV. ANALYSIS FORWCP-BASED PROTOCOL
Here, we apply the analyses introduced in the previous sec-
tion to the protocols using weak coherent pulses (WCP). We
consider the WCP-based BB84 protocol in the subsections A
and B, and move to the DQPS protocol in subsection C.
A. The WCP-BB84 protocol
Similarly to the ideal qubit-based protocol, the WCP-BB84
protocol also follows the procedures described in Sec. II, but
the latter assumes more general light sources and measure-
ment apparatuses. We prove the security of the WCP-BB84
protocol based on that of qubit-based BB84 protocol com-
bined with GLLP’s tagging idea [20]. We impose the follow-
ing assumptions on Alice and Bob’s devices. For Alice’s light
source, we assume that the four states ρˆW,a with W ∈ {Z, X}
and a ∈ {0, 1} are written as
ρˆW,a = (1 − rtag)ρˆW,a,unt ⊕ rtagρˆW,a,tag. (37)
For {ρˆW,a,unt}, we assume that there is a basis-independent state
χˆunt on the system AS satisfying
trA
(
(|aW〉 〈aW |A ⊗ 1ˆS )χˆunt
)
=
1
2
ρˆW,a,unt. (38)
6We place no restriction on the states {ρˆW,a,tag}. We may still
find a state χˆW,tag on the system AS such that
trA
(
(|aW〉 〈aW |A ⊗ 1ˆS )χˆW,tag
)
=
1
2
ρˆW,a,tag, (39)
but χˆW,tag depends on a selected basis W ∈ {Z, X}. The form of
Eq. (37) allows an interpretation that each round is classified
as either tagged or untagged [20]. The density operator ρˆW,a,unt
is the state of Alice’s untagged signal which may generate a
secure key and ρˆW,a,tag is that of her tagged signal which is
considered to be totally insecure. Equation (38) indicates that
Alice’s basis choice can be postponed until Bob receives the
system S for untagged rounds. Eqs. (37) and (38) are realized,
for example, if Alice uses a laser emitting an ideally polarized
coherent pulse with mean photon number µ and randomizes
its optical phase. In this case, ρˆW,a,unt and ρˆW,a,tag are written as
(1 − rtag)ρˆW,a,unt = e−µ |0W,a〉 〈0W,a| + µe−µ |1W,a〉 〈1W,a| (40)
rtagρˆW,a,tag = e−µ
∞∑
m=2
µm
m!
|mW,a〉 〈mW,a| (41)
where |mW,a〉 is an m-photon state with a basis W and a bit a,
and
rtag = 1 − e−µ − µe−µ (42)
represents the probability that Alice emits two or more pho-
tons. Our proof does not depend on the specific model such as
coherent light source, but depends only on Eqs. (37) and (38).
For Bob’s measurement apparatus, we impose either of the
following two assumptions.
(i) The probability of detecting a signal at Bob’s receiver is
independent of his basis choice.
(ii) The measurement of an input signal on the system S is re-
placed by an ideal single-photon measurement on the system
B preceding by a squashing operation [21, 22].
The condition (i), which is weaker than condition (ii), allows
us to use the security proof with complementarity [23] and
uncertainty principle [4]. The condition (ii) validates the use
of the security proof with entanglement distillation [17]. For
the WCP-BB84 protocol, both conditions are satisfied if we
assume the following model for Bob’s apparatus: Bob ac-
tively chooses the basis, and uses two threshold detectors cor-
responding to the measurement result “0” and “1” after a po-
larization beam splitter. He assigns random bit if both detec-
tors report their detections. In addition, the inefficiency and
dark countings of the detectors are allowed as long as they are
equivalently represented by an absorber and a stray photon
source placed in front of Bob’s apparatus.
For the proof with entanglement distillation, we use
Eqs. (38), (39) and the assumption (ii) of Bob’s apparatus to
convert the actual protocol equivalently to a protocol in which
Alice and Bob make ideal measurements on the qubit systems
A and B. Then a phase error is defined in the same way to the
ideal BB84 protocol, namely, an error between Alice’s and
Bob’s outcomes of ideal X-basis measurements ({|0X〉 , |1X〉})
on a Z-labeled round. As for the proof with complementarity,
phase error in a Z-labeled round is defined as an error oc-
curring when Alice makes an ideal X-basis measurement on
the system A and Bob makes the actual X-basis measurement
on the system S (the measurement conducted on X-labeled
rounds in the actual protocol).
The secure key length formulated in Eqs. (9)-(12) for the
ideal protocol can be adapted to the WCP protocol through
the tagging idea. Let kph,unt be the total number of phase errors
on the untagged Z-labeled rounds. Let nZ,unt be the number of
untagged Z-labeled rounds. Since each round can be classified
as tagged or untagged, nZ,unt is a well-defined random variable
in the actual protocol. Suppose that an upper bound of kph,unt
is given as a function of kX , nX , ntot and nZ,unt:
Pr(kph,unt > f (kX , nX , ntot, nZ,unt)) ≤ PE. (43)
According to the tagging idea, the final key is s-secret if
nfin ≤ nZ,unt(1 − h
(
f (kX , nX , ntot, nZ,unt)
nZ,unt
)
) − log2 2
PA
− λEC(c)
(44)
is satisfied. In the practical situation, the exact value of nZ,unt
is not available, and hence it is impossible to satisfy Eq. (44)
with certainty. Instead, we allow a small error probability
Z,unt. Suppose that there is a probabilistic lower bound nZ,unt
which satisfies
Pr(nZ,unt < nZ,unt) ≤ Z,unt. (45)
A key length as a function of observed values kX , nX , ntot is
given by minimizing the right-hand side of Eq. (44) in the
range of nZ,unt ≥ nZ,unt.
Under the assumptions for the source and measurement ap-
paratus, the basic distributions used in the previous section,
Eqs. (13) and (14), are still valid if we confine ourselves to
the untagged rounds. Although the fact may be intuitively
obvious for the WCP-BB84 protocol, here we give its math-
ematical justification since it helps when we treat a less intu-
itive protocol in Subsection IV C. We define a set of integers
labeling the rounds in the protocol as Nrep := {1, 2, ....nrep}.
As subsets of Nrep, let us define the set of the integers la-
beling the rounds where Alice (Bob) chooses X basis as XA
(XB) regardless of detection. Define those labeling the un-
tagged and detected rounds as Nunt. Let Kunt be a subset
of Nunt labeling the rounds which have errors when Alice
and Bob conduct virtual X-basis measurements regardless of
their basis choice. For any subset M, let M := Nrep \ M.
With these notations, kph,unt = |XA ∩ XB ∩ Kunt| and nZ,unt =
|XA ∩ XB ∩ Nunt|. We define other random variables as fol-
lows: kX,unt := |XA ∩ XB ∩ Kunt|, nX,unt := |XA ∩ XB ∩ Nunt|,
ktot,unt := kX,unt + kph,unt and ntot,unt := nX,unt + nZ,unt. From the
assumption of Alice’s source Eq. (38) and the assumptions of
Bob’s receiver (i) or (ii), the choice ofXA∩Nunt andXB∩Nunt
can be postponed after Nunt and Kunt are determined as far as
untagged incidents are concerned. Then we have
Pr(XA ∩ Nunt =MA,XB ∩ Nunt =MB | Kunt,Nunt)
= Θ(MA,Nunt)Θ(MB,Nunt) (46)
for allMA ⊂ Nunt andMB ⊂ Nunt, where we defined
Θ(M1,M2) = p˜|M1 |X p˜|M2\M1 |Z . (47)
7By simple calculation of the probability theory, we have
Pr(kX,unt | ktot,unt, ntot,unt) = BI(kX,unt; ktot,unt, pX). (48)
and
Pr(kX,unt | nX,unt, ktot,unt, ntot,unt) = HG(kX,unt; nX,unt, ktot,unt, ntot,unt),
(49)
which means that Eqs. (13) and (14) essentially hold true for
the untagged rounds.
Now we derive a key rate formula for the WCP BB84 pro-
tocol based on Eq. (48), as was done with the Bernoulli-
sampling method for the qubit-based protocol in Sec. III B.
First, we seek for f (kX , nX , ntot, nZ,unt) which satisfies Eq. (43).
Analogous to the derivation of Eq. (23) from Eq. (13), Eq. (48)
leads to
Pr(kph,unt > fBI(kX,unt) | ktot,unt, ntot,unt) ≤ PE (50)
for any ktot,unt and ntot,unt, and hence we have
Pr(kph,unt > fBI(kX,unt)) ≤ PE. (51)
Since kX,unt is not an observed value, we use the obvious bound
kX,unt ≤ kX . (52)
Using the inequality
CBI(kX + 1; ktot + 1, pX)
= CBI(kX; ktot, pX) + (1 − pX)BI(kX + 1; ktot, pX)
≥ CBI(kX; ktot, pX) (53)
in Eq. (18), we have fBI(kX) ≤ fBI(kX + 1), implying that
fBI(kX) is an increasing function. Hence, Eqs. (51) and (52)
lead to
Pr(kph,unt > fBI(kX)) ≤ PE, (54)
which means that fBI(kX) fulfills Eq. (43).
Next, we determine nZ,unt which satisfies Eq. (45). To de-
termine a lower bound of nZ,unt, we consider an upper bound
of nZ,tag := nZ − nZ,unt. Let NZ,tag be the number of rounds
where Alice chooses Z basis, Bob chooses Z basis and the
light source emits a tagged signal (two photons or more). As
those conditions are independent of each other as seen from
Eq. (37), we have
Pr(NZ,tag) = BI(NZ,tag, nrep, rtag p˜2Z). (55)
Since nZ,tag is the number of detected rounds among the NZ,tag
rounds,
nZ,tag ≤ NZ,tag (56)
holds. Eqs. (55) and (56) lead to
Pr(nZ,tag > n) ≤ 1 −CBI(n; nrep, rtag p˜2Z) (57)
for any n. Thus, we have
Pr(nZ,tag > g(rtag p˜2Z , Z,unt)) ≤ Z,unt (58)
where
g(x, y) := min
{
n
∣∣∣∣1 −CBI(n; nrep, x) ≤ y} . (59)
Let nZ,unt be
nZ,unt := nZ − g(rtag p˜2Z , Z,unt). (60)
By using nZ,tag = nZ − nZ,unt, Eq. (58) leads to
Pr(nZ,unt < nZ,unt) ≤ Z,unt. (61)
Since nZ,unt is known in principle in the actual protocol, the
final state ρfinAE is written as a direct sum of the part for nZ,unt <
nZ,unt and the one for nZ,unt ≥ nZ,unt. Hence, combined with
Eqs. (44), (54) and (61), by setting
s =
√
2
√
PE + PA + Z,unt, (62)
the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if
nfin ≤ l(BI)WCP := nZ,unt(1 − h
 fBI(kX)nZ,unt
) − log2 2
PA
− λEC(c).
(63)
Together with Eqs. (18), (19), (59) and (60), Eq. (63) consti-
tutes the main result of Sec IV A.
For the purpose of comparison, here we also discuss what
the key rate formula looks like if we start from Eq. (49), based
on simple random sampling. As we have derived Eq. (28)
from Eq. (14), Eq. (49) leads to
Pr(kph,unt > fHG(kX,unt, nX,unt, ntot,unt) | ktot,unt, ntot,unt) ≤ PE,
(64)
which, in turn, leads to
Pr(kph,unt > fHG(kX,unt, nX,unt, ntot,unt)) ≤ PE. (65)
Similarly to fBI(kX), we can prove that fHG(kX , nX , ntot) is an
increasing function of kX . Since kX,unt is upper-bounded by
Eq. (52), Eq. (65) leads to
Pr(kph,unt > fHG(kX , nX,unt, ntot,unt)) ≤ PE. (66)
In contrast to Eq. (54), it requires an additional estimation pro-
cess for nX,unt to obtain fHG(kX , nX,unt, ntot,unt). A lower bound
defined by nX,unt := nX − g(rtag p˜2X , X,unt) satisfies
Pr(nX,unt < nX,unt) ≤ X,unt. (67)
Combined with Eqs. (44), (66) and (67), by setting
s =
√
2
√
PE + PA + Z,unt + X,unt, (68)
the protocol is c-correct and s-secret if
nfin ≤ l(HG)WCP := minnZ,unt≥nZ,unt ξ(kX , nX,unt, nZ,unt)
ξ(kX , nX,unt, nZ,unt) := ξ˜(kX , nX,unt, nZ,unt) − log2
2
PA
− λEC(c)
ξ˜(kX , nX,unt, nZ,unt)
:= nZ,unt(1 − h
( fHG(kX , nX,unt, nX,unt + nZ,unt)
nZ,unt
)
).
(69)
8FIG. 2. Comparison of estimation methods for the WCP-BB84 pro-
tocol. Upper curve (Bernoulli-sampling method): Secure key ratio to
the asymptotic limit l(BI)WCP/(nrep/e) as a function of total rounds of the
protocol nrep. Lower curve (method with simple random sampling):
An upper bound on the derived secure key ratio l(HG)WCP/(nrep/e). We
assume no error (kX = 0) and no loss (ntot = nrep(1 − e−µ)). The se-
curity parameters are set to c = 10−15 and s = 10−10. In the limit of
nrep → ∞, each curve converges to lWCP/(nrep/e) = 1.
The reason that the minimization of nZ,unt appears is be-
cause ξ˜(kX , nX,unt, nZ,unt) is not monotone-increasing function
of nZ,unt. For example, with PE = 1/16 × 10−20, we nu-
merically confirmed that ξ˜(0, 25000, 25318) ∼ 24631 and
ξ˜(0, 25000, 25319) ∼ 24623. This means that the protocol
with final key length l = ξ(kX , nX,unt, nZ,unt) is not necessarily
secure.
As can be seen from the comparison between Eqs. (63) and
(69), the method with simple random sampling is much more
complicated than the Bernoulli-sampling method, involving
an additional estimated parameter and a minimization. More-
over, as shown in Sec. IV B, it tends to give a key rate lower
than the Bernoulli-sampling method, probably because of the
use of pessimistic bound on nX,unt.
B. Numerical examples
Here, we show two examples of numerical calculation for
the WCP-BB84 protocol. We assume that the light source
emits a pulse whose photon-number distribution is Poissonian
with mean µ, namely, Eq. (42). Like Fig. 1 for the ideal pro-
tocol, we first calculated the simplest case where no error is
observed (kX = 0) and no loss occurs (ntot = nrep(1 − e−µ)),
which is shown in Fig. 2. The cost of error correction was
set to λEC(c) = log2(1/c). We assumed nZ = ntot p˜
2
Z and
nX = ntot p˜2X . The values of p˜X and µ were optimized for each
value of nrep. For calculation of l
(BI)
WCP, the security parame-
ters were set to c = 10−15, s = 10−10, PE = 1/16 × 10−20,
PA = 1/16×10−20 and Z,unt = 1/2×10−10. The result is shown
as the red curve in Fig. 2, where the key length Eq. (63) is nor-
malized by the optimized asymptotic key rate of 1/e per signal
at µ = 1 and p˜X → 0. We see that a final key can be extracted
when the total rounds nrep is more than ∼ 103.7 while the
FIG. 3. Secure key rate per signal of the WCP-BB84 protocol
l(BI)WCP/nrep as a function of channel transmission ηc. The parame-
ters are set to be the same as Ref. [24]. Quantum efficiency of de-
tectors: ηd = 0.1. Dark count probability per pulse per detector:
pdark = 10−5. Loss-independent bit error: 0.5%. Error correction
cost: λEC(c) = 1.05h(E/Q) + log2(1/c). The security parameters:
c = 10−10 and s = 10−5. From the top to the bottom curve, the num-
ber of detected signals are ndet = 107, 106, 105 and 104, respectively.
The required number of detected signals to generate a final key is less
than 104, while it was ∼ 107 in the previous result [24].
threshold is nrep ∼ 103.2 for the ideal protocol using the same
parameters (see also Fig. 1). For comparison, we also calcu-
lated the value of ξ(kX , nX,unt, nZ,unt)/(nrep/e) under the same
condition, which is shown as the blue curve in Fig. 2. The
security parameters were the same as the red curve, except for
Z,unt = X,unt = 1/4× 10−10. The quantity ξ(kX , nX,unt, nZ,unt) is
an upper bound of l(HG)WCP derived in Eq. (69). The figure shows
that the key length l(BI)WCP from Bernoulli sampling is higher
than l(HG)WCP from simple random sampling. A possible reason is
that the estimation of nX,unt, which is a pessimistic bound of
nX,unt, is not required in determining fBI(kX).
In Fig. 3, we show a result in more practical situations based
on Eq. (63) to make comparison to the previous finite-key
analysis for the WCP-BB84 protocol [24]. The figure shows
the dependence of secure key rate l(BI)WCP/nrep on the channel
transmission ηc. In each curve, the number of Bob’s detected
signals ndet is fixed as ndet = 104, 105, 106 and 107. The pa-
rameters were chosen to be the same as [24]: Quantum effi-
ciency of both detectors is ηd = 0.1 and a dark count prob-
ability per pulse is pdark = 10−5 per detector. In addition
to errors from dark counts, there is a 0.5% loss-independent
bit error. The security parameters were set to c = 10−10,
s = 10−5, PE = 1/16 × 10−10, PA = 1/16 × 10−10,
and Z,unt = 1/2 × 10−5. Total transmission rate is Q =
1 − (1 − 2pdark)e−µηcηd , and error rate is given by E/Q where
E = 0.005(1 − e−µηcηd ) + pdarke−µηcηd . Based on the param-
eters above, we assume λEC(c) = 1.05h(E/Q) + log2(1/c),
nrep = ndet/Q, nZ = ndet p˜2Z , nX = ndet p˜
2
X and kX = nXE/Q. To
save the computation time, we used Chernoff bound [25]
CBI(kX; ktot, pX) ≤ D
(
kX
ktot
, ktot, pX
)
(70)
9for (kX , ktot, pX) satisfying kX ≤ ktotpX , where
D(x, y, z) :=
( zx
)x( 1 − z
1 − x
)1−xy . (71)
In Fig. 3, we see that a key can be extracted even when ndet =
104. This is a significant improvement from the result of [24],
in which the required number of detected signals to generate
a final key is ndet ∼ 107.
C. The DQPS protocol
In this section, we conduct finite-key analysis of the
DQPS protocol based on the property of binomial distribu-
tion Eq. (48). The security of the DQPS protocol was recently
proved in the asymptotic limit [13]. The DQPS protocol uses
encoding on four relative phases {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 } between neigh-
boring pulses in a pulse train of fixed length L. The DQPS
protocol has essentially the same setup as the BB84 protocol
with phase encoding (PE-BB84 protocol), which can be re-
garded as the DQPS protocol with L = 2. In Ref. [13], we
showed that the secure key rate of the DQPS protocol is 8/3 as
high as that of the PE-BB84 protocol in the asymptotic limit.
However, since the security proof is not so straightforward as
that of the BB84 protocol, it is not trivial whether the advan-
tage of the DQPS protocol over the PE-BB84 protocol still
holds considering the statistical fluctuations in the finite-key
case. This motivates us to conduct finite-key analysis for the
DQPS protocol by using the Bernoulli-sampling method pro-
posed in this work.
The overview of the DQPS protocol is shown in Fig. 4. The
precise description of the protocol and physical assumptions
for the security proof is given in Appendix. In the protocol,
Z basis is chosen with probability p˜Z to generate keys and X
basis is chosen with probability p˜X for leak monitoring. Rel-
ative phases between adjacent pulses are modulated by {0, pi}
for Z basis and { pi2 , 3pi2 } for X basis. The protocol regards L-
successive pulses as a block, and at most one key bit is ex-
tracted from each block. The randomization of the optical
phase is conducted to the whole block, and a basis is also cho-
sen for each block. Bob’s receiver is composed of delayed
interferometer with its delay being equal to the interval ∆τ of
adjacent pulses. The longer arm of the interferometer incurs
phase shift 0 (Z-basis) or pi/2 (X-basis), which are chosen with
probability p˜Z and p˜X , respectively. After the interferometer,
the pulses are measured by two photon detectors correspond-
ing to bit values “0” and “1”. If there is a detection from the
superposition of the l-th and the (l − 1)-th original pulses, we
call it valid detection at l-th timing (1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1). An inter-
ference between different blocks at Bob’s receiver is invalid
and does not contribute to a key, which means that 1/L of the
whole detection events must be discarded. This is the origin
of the advantage of the DQPS protocol over the PE-BB84 pro-
tocol, which is regarded as the DQPS protocol with L = 2.
In the DQPS protocol, application of the tagging idea is not
straightforward since the chain of coherence among succes-
sive pulses prohibits us from defining the total photon number
FIG. 4. Setup for the L-pulse DQPS protocol. The protocol regards a
train of L pulses as a block, and the working basis is chosen for each
block. At Alice’s site, pulses are modulated with phase {0, pi, pi2 , 3pi2 }
according to her random bit and basis choice. The randomization of
the overall optical phase is also done for each block of L pulses. At
Bob’s site, each pulse train is fed to a delayed Mach-Zehnder inter-
ferometer with phase shift 0 or pi2 according to his basis choice. Valid
timings of detection are labeled by integers 1, 2, .., L − 1, according
to the index of the pulse from the short arm of the interferometer.
Detection from interference between pulses from different blocks is
regarded as invalid and ignored.
in neighboring two pulses. As a result, the conventional defi-
nition of tagging based on the emitted photon number cannot
be applied here. In [13], we proposed an alternative approach
to define the photon number indirectly through Bob’s detec-
tion timing j and Alice’s measurement result on her qubits,
which enables us to assume that each round in the protocol is
classified as either tagged or untagged. As a result, the vari-
ables kph,unt and nZ,unt can be defined in the same way as in the
WCP-BB84 protocol, and the argument up to Eq. (45) holds
for the DQPS protocol as well. The remaining tasks are to
find a function f satisfying Eq. (43) and to find a bound nZ,unt
satisfying Eq. (45), both of which require slightly different
approaches from the WCP-BB84 protocol.
Since our tagging definition for the DQPS protocol involves
Bob’s detection timing j, we cannot decompose the emitted
states as in Eq. (37). Hence we need to justify Eq. (46) without
using Eq. (38). This was essentially done in Ref. [13], which
proved, in the notation of the present paper [26], that the joint
probability of XA, Kunt and Nunt is written in the following
form:
Pr(XA,Kunt,Nunt)
= Θ(XA,Nrep)β′(XA ∩ Nunt,Kunt,Nunt). (72)
Since Θ(M,Nrep) defined in Eq. (47) satisfies
Θ(M,Nrep) = Θ(M∩Nunt,Nunt)Θ(M∩Nunt,Nunt) (73)
for anyM ⊂ Nrep, from Eq. (72) we have
Pr(XA ∩ Nunt =MA | Kunt,Nunt)
= Θ(MA,Nunt)γ(Kunt,Nunt) (74)
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for anyMA ⊂ Nunt, where
γ(Kunt,Nunt)
:=
∑
M′A⊂Nunt Θ(M
′
A,Nunt)β′(M′A,Kunt,Nunt)
Pr(Kunt,Nunt) . (75)
Since the sum of Θ(MA,Nunt) overMA is unity, Eq. (74) leads
to γ(Kunt,Nunt) = 1. Thus, we have
Pr(XA ∩ Nunt =MA | Kunt,Nunt)
= Θ(MA,Nunt). (76)
In the DQPS protocol, Bob’s basis choice can be postponed
after he confirms photon detection, which means that the
choice of XB can be conducted after Kunt and Nunt are de-
termined. Hence, we have
Pr(XA ∩ Nunt =MA,XB ∩ Nunt =MB | Kunt,Nunt)
= Θ(MA,Nunt)Θ(MB,Nunt), (77)
which is identical to Eq. (46). Similarly to the WCP-BB84
protocol, Eq. (48) holds, which leads to the Eq. (51):
Pr(kph,unt > fBI(kX)) ≤ PE. (78)
The task of finding a bound nZ,unt satisfying Eq. (45) is
done as follows. In Ref. [13], a modified protocol having
exactly the same Pr(nZ,tag) as the original protocol was in-
troduced, in which a random variable N (denoted as n(c =
d = 0, (z′0...z
′
L−1) < Γ
(m)) in Eq. (40) of Ref. [13]) satisfying
N ≥ nZ,tag is defined. The variable obeys binomial distribution
BI(N, nrep, rtag p˜2Z), where rtag is a property of the light source
defined as
rtag := 1 −
∑
m
tr(Πˆ(m)S σˆS ), (79)
where σˆS is the state of L pulses emitted from Alice’s light
source, and Πˆ(m)S is a projector which is defined in Appendix.
This implies that Pr(nZ,tag) in the original protocol has the fol-
lowing property: There exists a function P(nZ,tag,N) satisfying
Pr(nZ,tag) =
∑
N
P(nZ,tag,N)
P(nZ,tag,N) = 0 for nZ,tag > N∑
nZ,tag
P(nZ,tag,N) = BI(N, nrep, rtag p˜2Z). (80)
This leads to
Pr(nZ,tag > n) ≤ 1 −CBI(n; nrep, rtag p˜2Z) (81)
for any n, which is identical to Eq. (57). Then, following the
same argument as the WCP-BB84 protocol, we see that
Pr(nZ,unt < nZ,unt) ≤ Z,unt (82)
holds with
nZ,unt := nZ − g(rtag p˜2Z , Z,unt). (83)
nrepL→ ∞
nrepL= 10
7
FIG. 5. Secure key rate per pulse of the DQPS protocol lDQPS/(nrepL)
as a function of overall transmission η. Solid curves are the results of
the finite key analysis with total pulse number nrepL = 107 and dashed
curves are the results of the asymptotic case (nrepL → ∞), which are
obtained in Ref. [13]. For both solid and dotted curves, the top, mid-
dle and bottom curves represent the key rate for L = 20, L = 4 and
L = 2, respectively. The parameters are set as follows. Dark count
rate per pulse per detector: pdark = 0.5 × 10−5. Loss-independent bit
error: 3%. Cost for error correction: λEC(c) = 1.1h(E) + log2(1/c).
The security parameter: c = 10−15 and s = 10−10. We see that the
key rate of the DQPS protocol (L > 2) is higher than that of the PE-
BB84 protocol (L = 2) for both the asymptotic and finite-key cases.
From Eqs. (44), (78) and (82), we arrive at a key rate for-
mula which is identical to Eq. (63): The L-pulse DQPS proto-
col is c-correct and s-secret if the final key length nfin satis-
fies
nfin ≤ lDQPS := nZ,unt(1 − h
 fBI(kX)nZ,unt
) − log2 2
PA
− λEC(c)
(84)
where s is given in Eq. (62). Together with Eqs. (18), (19),
(59), (79) and (83), Eq. (84) constitutes the main result of Sec
IV C.
In Fig. 5, we show numerical results of secure key rate
per pulse lDQPS/(nrepL) as a function of overall transmittance
η := ηcηd to compare the DQPS protocol (L > 2) and the PE-
BB84 protocol (L = 2). The solid curves represent the key rate
with fixed pulse number nrepL = 107, and the dashed curves
represent the one for the asymptotic case, which is obtained
in our previous work [13]. We assumed that Alice generates a
weak coherent pulse of mean photon number µ. In this case,
rtag is given by
rtag = 1 −
dL/2e∑
m=0
e−µLµmL+1−mCm. (85)
Note that for L = 2, rtag = 1 − e−2µ − 2µe−2µ is identical
to the probability that two or more photons are emitted in
a double-pulse signal in the PE-BB84 protocol. We assume
dark count rate per pulse per detector pdark = 0.5× 10−5 and a
loss-independent bit error rate 3%. We also assumed that Q =
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1− (1−2(L−1)pdark)e−(L−1)µη, reflecting the fact that there are
L−1 valid timings in a block. Error rate is given by E/Q where
E = 0.03(1− e−(L−1)µη) + pdarke−(L−1)µη(L− 1). Based on these
parameters, we assume λEC(c) = 1.1h(E/Q) + log2(1/c),
nZ = nrepQp˜2Z , nX = nrepQp˜
2
X and kX = nXE/Q. The values
of p˜X and µ are optimized to maximize the key length. In the
asymptotic limit, the parameter optimization leads to p˜X → 0,
nZ,unt → nrep(Q− rtag) and fBI(kX)/nZ,unt → E/(Q− rtag) while
Q and E are fixed. In finite-key cases, the Chernoff bound is
used to calculate the key rate. The security parameters are set
to be the same as those in Fig. 2. We see that the advantage of
the DQPS protocol over the PE-BB84 protocol is maintained
even if we include the effect of the finiteness of the key.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we proposed a method of finite-key analy-
sis based on Bernoulli sampling instead of simple random
sampling. For the BB84 protocol using biased basis choice,
the data gathered on one of the basis is solely used for esti-
mation of the disturbance in the other basis, which enables
us to regard the former as a sample drawn from the popula-
tion via Bernoulli sampling. As a result, we obtained finite-
sized key-length formulas based on the binomial distribution
parametrized by the probability of the basis choice in the pro-
tocol. The appearance of the binomial distribution in our case
is a direct consequence of the inherent statistics of the proto-
col, and it should be differentiated from the previous works
which uses a binomial distribution to derive an upper bound
on the hypergeometric distribution arising from simple ran-
dom sampling.
The new method is particularly suited for the BB84 proto-
col with WCP. It enables simpler analysis compared to the
method with simple random sampling since only the latter
requires the estimation of the sample size (nX,unt). We may
expect that this additional pessimistic bound makes the con-
ventional method less efficient, which is corroborated by a
numerical example showing that the key rate for the WCP-
BB84 protocol obtained with our method is higher than that
with simple random sampling. To make comparison with the
previous finite-key analysis for the WCP-BB84 protocol [24],
we calculated the key rate as a function of channel transmis-
sion and the number of detected signals, in the same practical
parameter settings. The result shows that, while ndet ∼ 107
signals are necessary for producing a key in Ref. [24], our
method only needs ndet ∼ 104 with the same parameters. In
addition, the improved number 104 clarifies that the use of
WCP instead of an ideal single photon causes only a small
change in the finite-size effect. This was also confirmed in the
numerical simulation assuming the perfect channel, in which
the required number of rounds to generate a key is nrep ∼ 103.7
for the WCP-BB84 protocol and is nrep ∼ 103.2 for the single-
photon BB84 protocol.
Finally, we applied the Bernoulli-sampling method to the
DQPS protocol, which was recently proved to be secure in the
asymptotic regime. Although the asymptotic proof is based
on the tagging of the insecure rounds as in the WCP-BB84
protocol, the definition of the tagged round is much more con-
voluted and makes sense only after the signal was detected by
Bob. Nonetheless, our finite-key analysis has led to a key rate
formula closely analogous to the one for the WCP-BB84 pro-
tocol. Numerical calculation shows that the DQPS protocol
retains higher key rates than the BB84 protocol with phase en-
coding (PE-BB84) even in the finite-key regime of nrep = 107.
It is expected that our method can also be applied to pro-
tocols with decoy states [27–29]. Since the existing analy-
ses [6–9] with decoy states involve the estimation of the sam-
ple size nX,unt, the present method may provide a simpler anal-
ysis compared to the conventional methods with simple ran-
dom sampling. It should be mentioned that some of the finite
key analyses [6, 7] assumed the announcement of basis choice
after each round to make the sample size fixed, which were
later pointed out [30] to open a security hole against a sift-
ing attack. This illustrates an importance of simpler and more
straightforward methods, and we believe that the method pro-
posed here will contribute in this regard.
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Appendix: Description of the DQPS protocol
Here we summarize the detail of the DQPS protocol in
Ref. [13]. The protocol proceeds as follows, which includes
predetermined parameters p˜X > 0, p˜Z = 1 − p˜X , L ≥ 2, and
nrep.
1. Alice selects a bit c ∈ {0, 1} with probability p˜Z and p˜X ,
which correspond to the choice of Z basis and X basis, re-
spectively. Bob also selects d ∈ {0, 1} with probability p˜Z and
p˜X .
2. Alice generates L random bits al ∈ {0, 1} (l = 0, 1, .., L−1),
and prepares L optical pulses (system S ) in the state
ρˆS = Sˆ ({al}, c)σˆS Sˆ ({al}, c)
Sˆ ({al}, c) :=
L−1⊗
l=0
exp(i(alpi +
pi
2
lc)nˆl) (A.1)
where σˆS is the state of the L pulses from the source before
phase modulation and nˆl represents the photon number
operator for the l-th pulse. Alice randomizes the overall
optical phase of the L-pulse train, and sends it to Bob.
3. If d = 0, Bob sets the phase shift θB = 0. If d = 1, he sets
θB =
pi
2 .
4. If there is no detection of photons at the valid timings, Bob
sets j = 0. If the detections have only occurred at a single
valid timing, the variable j is set to the index of the timing. If
there are detections at multiple timings, the smallest (earliest)
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index of them is assigned to j. If j , 0, Bob determines
his raw key bit b ∈ {0, 1} depending on which detector has
reported detection at the j-th timing. If both detectors have
reported at the j-th timing, a random bit is assigned to b. Bob
announces j publicly.
5. If j , 0, Alice determines her raw key bit as a = a j−1 ⊕ a j.
6. Alice and Bob repeat the above procedures nrep times.
They publicly disclose c and d for each of the nrep rounds.
7. Alice and Bob define bit strings κA,X and κB,X , respectively,
by concatenating their determined bits with j , 0 and
c = d = 1. They define sifted keys κA,Z and κB,Z , respectively,
by concatenating their determined bits with j , 0 and
c = d = 0. Let their sizes be nZ := |κA,Z | = |κB,Z | and
nX := |κA,X | = |κB,X |.
8. They disclose and compare κA,X and κB,X to determine the
number of bit errors kX included in them.
9. Through public discussion, Bob corrects his keys κB,Z
to make it coincide with Alice’s key κA,Z and obtains κcorB,Z
(|κcorB,Z | = nZ).
10. Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by shorten-
ing κA,Z and κcorB,Z to obtain final keys κ
fin
A,Z and κ
fin
B,Z of size nfin.
The security of the above protocol in the asymptotic limit
was proved in [13] under the following assumptions on the
devices used by Alice and Bob. The discussion in subsection
IV C of the main text uses the same assumptions. We assume
that the phase randomization in Step 2 is ideal, and hence the
state emitted from Alice in Step 2 is expressed as∑
m
NˆmρˆS Nˆm, (A.2)
where Nˆm represents the projector onto the subspace with m
total photons in the L pulses. We also assume that a parameter
rtag associated with the L-pulse state σˆS from the source is
known or at least is bounded from above. With |ml〉S ,l being
an m-photon state of the l-th pulse, the parameter is defined
by Eq. (85) with
Πˆ
(m)
S :=
∑
{ml}∈Γ(m)
L−1⊗
l=0
|ml〉 〈ml|S ,l (A.3)
where Γ(m) is a set of values of L nonnegative integers
Γ(m) :=
(i0, · · · , iL−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ il−1 + il ≤ 1(1 ≤ l ≤ L − 1), L−1∑
l=0
il = m
 .
(A.4)
In [13], we showed a practical method of off-line calibration
to determine an upper bound of rtag for a general light source.
To describe the assumptions for Bob’s apparatus, we intro-
duce POVM elements for Bob’s procedure in Steps 3 and 4.
Let {Bˆ(d)j } j=0,...,L−1 be the POVM for Bob’s procedure of deter-
mining j, when the basis d was selected in Step 1. We further
decompose the elements for j , 0 as Bˆ(d)j = Bˆ
(d)
j,0 + Bˆ
(d)
j,1 , where
Bˆ(d)j,b corresponds to the outcome ( j, b). These operators satisfy
Bˆ(d)0 +
L−1∑
j=1
(Bˆ(d)j,0 + Bˆ
(d)
j,1) = 1ˆ. (A.5)
We then assume that Bob uses threshold detectors, and further
assume that the inefficiency and dark countings of the detec-
tors are equivalently represented by an absorber and a stray
photon source placed in front of Bob’s apparatus, and hence
they are included in the quantum channel. This leads [13] to
the condition
Bˆ(0)j = Bˆ
(1)
j (0 ≤ j ≤ L − 1). (A.6)
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